But
there is another lesson of the 1930s. It is that although capitalism
survives it is capable of retreating behind a protectionist shell, at
great cost to global prosperity. This is a real danger today. The "Buy
American" provisions in President Barack Obama's fiscal boost are an
ominous sign. The impulse to resort to protection when economic
hardship suddenly strikes is, of course, always present. But there is
today a dangerous new factor which magnifies the threat. The leaders of
some of America's largest corporations have already joined up with
organised labour (the AFL-CIO) to urge Congress to impose tariffs
against imports from countries (such as China, for example) which are
understandably unwilling to bear the heavy costs of an obligation to
curb their carbon dioxide emissions. There is considerable support in
Europe, notably within the European Commission and in France, for a
similar approach.
It
is essential, both in the US and in Europe, that this is resolutely
rejected. The first and most important requirement for the future of
capitalism is the preservation of globalisation, and the massive
benefits it confers on mankind, in particular in the developing world.
There are, inevitably, costs of globalisation; but they are hugely
outweighed by the benefits. So resistance to protection, whatever
arguments may be used in its favour, must be rigorously maintained. Nor
is this an exclusively economic argument. It is a moral imperative, as
well. Moreover, a trade war with China could well have unpredictable,
and potentially highly damaging, political consequences.
But
will capitalism need to change in the future? Again, the lesson of
history is that the answer is "not really". The economic cycle is
endemic and inescapable, and everyone (with the exception of prime
minister Gordon Brown) has always known this. What the current crisis
does underline, however, is that a cyclical downturn associated with a
collapse of the banking system is by an order of magnitude worse than a
normal cyclical downturn.
So
there does need to be a change to the banking system. In a nutshell, we
need to return, in all major financial centres, to the separation of
commercial banking from investment banking that was enforced in the US
under the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, until it was repealed by President
Bill Clinton in the 1990s. This is all the more important since we now
live in an age in which the acquisition of wealth appears to count for
more than reputation.
Achieving
this will not be easy or popular in banking circles, but it can be
done. We have time to get it right: this is not firefighting, but
fireproofing.
The
overriding reason why this separation is essential is straightforward.
It is only a commercial banking crisis that poses a systemic risk and
can lead to the sort of mess we face today. It is folly to allow core
banks to be in a position where they can be brought down by exciting
but highly risky investment banking activities. But the idea that this
can be prevented by judicious regulation of investment banking
activities is a chimaera. In the real world, that is not possible:
either the investment bankers will outsmart the regulators, or the
regulators will respond with damaging overkill.
Thus
investment banks should be left to their own creative devices, and
subject essentially only to the discipline of the marketplace. This
leaves a much more limited, and practicable, but still absolutely
essential, role for bank supervision and regulation: namely, to ensure
that the core commercial banking system is thoroughly sound and
adequately capitalised at all times.
It
is worth adding that it is the capital adequacy regime, and not
primarily interest rate policy, which needs to be responsive to
asset-price bubbles.
What
else (other than the maintenance of what passes for world peace) is
needed to ensure that capitalism survives (as it will) and prospers (as
it should)?
There
is a danger in many parts of the world, and certainly in the UK, to
imagine that since this is a global problem it requires a global
solution, so the overriding need is for a global agreement. This may
sound statesmanlike, but it is in fact a dangerous delusion. The
overriding need is for the authorities in each country to put their own
house in order.
The
threat from terrorism is an instructive parallel. Terrorism is indeed a
global problem, and international co-operation is clearly desirable.
But that in no way diminishes the overriding duty of national
governments to do what is necessary to protect their own people.
The
same applies to financial regulation. As the Basel II bank capital
rules clearly showed, international agreement is slow in arriving and,
when it does arrive, it is likely to prove inadequate. As far as the UK
is concerned, Mr Brown's decision, as chancellor, to scrap the
strengthened system of bank supervision I put in place in 1987 and
replace it with a system that has proved largely dysfunctional was not
very clever. Without waiting for global agreement, however desirable
that may be, we need to, and can, do a great deal better.